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ABSTRAK
Artikel ini adalah laporan penelitian atas wacana penodaan agama dalam kaitannya dengan praktek 
digital di Indonesia. Artikel ini berusaha memahami pergeseran partisipasi publik dalam membentuk 
wacana tersebut, yang kesemuanya dibingkai dalam kondisi yang kami sebut “masyarakat monitor.” 
Penelitian ini adalah penelitian kualitatif dengan beragam metode termasuk wawancara dan 
pengamatan di media sosial. Wacana penodaan agama sudah tua usianya tetapi di era digital ini 
muncul dalam wajah yang rumit karena digerakkan dalam logika informasi digital yang menekankan 
pada aksesibilitas, efisiensi pesan, dan unjuk kerja. Berdasarkan amatan perkembangan politik saat 
ini, tampaknya wacana penodaan agama terserap dalam wacana politik dalam rupa informasi yang 
digunakan sebagai bagian dari pertarungan politik (weaponized information). Dalam kondisi ini bisa jadi 
wacana ini menyendatkan proses demokrasi digital, yang dahulu sempat menjadi retorika kemunculan 
teknologi digital. Pada akhirnya, wacana ini lebih berbicara soal kesalehan publik dan ketertiban umum. 
Ia lebih mengutamakan batas-batas yang dapat diterima dalam wacana agama daripada berbicara soal 
peningkatan kehidupan beragama dan kesalehan pribadi.
Kata Kunci: Demokrasi digital; Masyarakat monitor; Penodaan agama.
ABSTRACT
The present article is a research report on the discourse of religious blasphemy in connection with 
digital practices in Indonesia. It sought to understand the shift of public participation in shaping the 
discourse that understood within the framework we identified as “monitory society.” The research 
employed qualitative approach by using several methods, among others are interview and social media 
observation. Reflecting upon the current national trends and new shift of political landscape, it appeared 
that religious blasphemy immersed into the political discourse as weaponized information, hence 
disrupted the meaning of democracy in digital age, as once become the rhetoric of digital technology. In 
general, the discourse of religious blasphemy in Indonesia is dealing with public piety and social order. 
It concerned more on religious boundary rather than the improvement of religious lives and personal 
piety.
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INTRODUCTION
The rapid sociopolitical changes in con-
temporary Indonesia could be understood as 
expanding and extension, and also shifting 
position of the guardian of democracy. Be-
sides the presumed three traditional estates 
of democracy, viz. The legislature, execu-
tive, and judiciary institutions, many argued 
that journalism and the press occupied the 
fourth estate to provide a checking point of 
the governance machinery (See Powe, 1992; 
Baker, 2006). Journalism exercised its com-
municative function as conduit amongst the 
state, market and the citizen. Particularly in 
relationship with the state, press in different 
quality and degree performed the function 
of “monitory.” As observed by John Keane, 
lately there was emerged another monitorial 
estate – arguably a “fifth” estate – i.e. watch-
dog organizations that summoned the state 
in regards of the quality of public policy pro-
duced by the government (see Keane, 2010). 
In Indonesian context we witnessed the 
emergence of such institutions such as Indo-
nesian Forum for the Environment (WALHI/ 
Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia), Indo-
nesian Corruption Watch (ICW), Alliances 
for Customary Society (AMAN/Aliansi Ma-
syarakat Adat Nusantara). They played crucial 
role in shaping and reshaping the democratic 
quality. The emergence of internet further re-
configures the meaning of this monitorial de-
mocracy as there is a growing unprecedented 
participation of the public, which once it 
gave a promise for democratization of public 
space.
To the latter and in Indonesian context, 
a note necessary to put forward as a crucial 
moment took place in 2010, when the global 
capital repatriation flowed into the Indone-
sian market, in response to the United States 
and European economic crisis. Indonesia 
received significant global capital injection 
that in a way stimulated the government and 
commercial sector to provide better internet 
infrastructure. Despite the euphoria of the 
freedom of information access, it brought the 
amalgam of dividends but also constraints, 
as many of Indonesians then were less pre-
pared for digital life and its complexity.
In terms of democratic institution and 
its quality, what come next is predictable; the 
Web 2.0 e-ruption, notably driven by social 
media services (Fraser and Dutta, 2008, p. 144) 
shaped in part of the Indonesian democracy 
space, as it dispersed the centers from the for-
mer institutional orientation to multiple polit-
ical practices, including those shaped by new 
actors and other subjectivities. To this condi-
tion we may notice the monitory function 
further expanded from press and watchdog 
organizations to the larger citizen complicity.
This shift must not be understood as the 
triumph of digital democracy over offline de-
mocracy, but rather a crucial dialectic among 
the estates whose determined the quality of 
democracy. In this dialectic, the monitory 
function of press and watchdog organiza-
tions is pushed forward by ordinary indi-
vidual citizen, in extended and multiplied 
way made possible by internet. Any societal 
element now has the capacity and technol-
ogy not only to obtain information, establish 
digital social life, but also on the other hand, 
to observe and monitor other activities that 
affected to their “ideological” and rightsizing 
their “political” persuasion, which at some 
point trigger a collective activity among the 
people shared the same position. More than 
just internet, it was also because of the imple-
mentation of the communication regulation, 
viz. Law No. 11/2008 on Information and 
Electronic Transaction (revised by Law No. 
19/2016, altogether hereinafter “UU ITE”), 
which provided a new social space for the 
public at large to exercise their rights within 
the context of digital activities. At this junc-
ture the caveat of UU ITE and democracy in 
digital era, in relationship with the discourse 
of religious blasphemy is lurking.
In this article, we looked on the increas-
ing public participation to made use demo-
cratic arms, in particular law enforcement 
agencies and justice system, to extend their 
concerns, which in some ways do not reflect 
the deliberation of democratic ends. Com-
bined with the problem of corruption, in-
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competence, and complicated understanding 
of inter-religious relationship in Indonesia, 
the discourse of religious blasphemy at this 
point, is part of this equation.
Not with standing the long history of 
harmonious inter-religious interaction in 
Indonesia, it was also history of the uneasy 
relationship, notably between Muslims and 
the Christians. Within the frame of traumatic 
religious interaction (see Husein, 2005; Muji-
burrahman, 2006), Indonesian political land-
scape shaped by its current practices related 
to the using of religious blasphemy as a wea-
ponized information by the citizen. Internet 
and social media give a sense of collective 
panoptical power to observe, monitor, and 
response, even to the degree of invading oth-
er people private space. We understand this 
condition as “monitory society.” The employ-
ment of UU ITE and law enforcement activi-
ties in relation to it gives a further gravity to 
complicated condition of democracy in digi-
tal age. We somehow entertained ourselves 
that at this juncture there is “democracy but 
without the democrats.” 
In the present-day world, there is an 
indication of the raising disaffection among 
the public toward democracy. The election 
of some “right-wing” global leaderships such 
as Donald Trump, Rodrigo Duterte, and Na-
rendra Modi in the political stages might give 
some justification to this trend. 
The problem even more suppressing 
with the stronger implementation of law 
against religious blasphemy in many coun-
tries in the world, including those that ad-
opted “democratic” systems. Pew Research 
Center registered 32 countries that main-
tained religious blasphemy law (Grim, 2012). 
On the other hand, the Brookings Institution 
furthermore reported that “47% countries 
and territories in the world applied different 
degrees of laws against religious blasphe-
my.” As pointed out by an Indonesian jour-
nalist, the law is not necessary protecting the 
sacred of religion, it is become a stick to sup-
press the minority groups, such as Ahmadi-
yya and Shi’ite in Indonesian case (Bayuni, 
2011). Accordingly, the law against religious 
blasphemy “forbid insulting religion and 
religious symbols or interpreting religious 
texts in a way that conflicts with the state’s 
interpretation” (Fiss, 2016, p. 5). 
For some outsiders, Indonesia is por-
trayed as an example of successful country 
managing religious diversity. They cham-
pioned Indonesia for not falling into reli-
gious-based state, though hosting the largest 
Muslims in the world. However, there were 
complicated historical precedence that In-
donesia never a straight forward exemplary 
country. The picture is much more compli-
cated, the challenge is great, and different 
streams of socio-political and religious pro-
cesses were overlapping. Many of the schol-
ars believed that the “conservative turn” was 
on the rise (Bruinessen, 2013), while other 
identify the “pastoral turn” in which the gov-
ernmentality over the public piety endorsed 
by multiple levels of society (Epafras, 2019). 
Some other more optimistic and balanced, 
since they believe that there is remain a 
strong civil society in Indonesia (Seo, 2013; 
Zuidweg, 2018). 
The complexity even greater after the 
cease of Soeharto’s administration and Indo-
nesia entered to what was called Reforma-
tion Era in 1998. One of the features of this 
era is the “return of the suppressed.” The effects 
of this was immensed. People testified the in-
creasing of politics of identity and transna-
tional religious discourse. 
On the flipside, at this historical moment 
there was the first step toward digital soci-
ety and the creation of Indonesian netizens. 
However, regardless the initial dream of the 
greater penetration of democracy in the pub-
lic lives, apparently the digital exposure does 
not necessarily correlate with the develop-
ment of democracy in certain country (Klu-
ver and Banerjee, 2005). On the other hand, 
digital technology induced a unique social 
behavior including those of religious be-
havior and fueled the more confrontational 
politics of identity and compartmentalized 
religious expression.
Another interesting development is that 
the raising of what earlier John Keane intro-
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duction of “monitory democracy” (Keane, 2010; 
2011; 2013). As earlier mentioned, it could 
consider as the fifth pillar of democracy, in 
which there emerged the civil society orga-
nizations that the sole purpose is to control 
and check the government on the matter of 
public goods and policies. In this research, 
we push little bit this issue in regards of re-
ligious discourse that in the context of moni-
tory democracy, the bargaining position of 
certain religious authority, such as Indone-
sian Ulema Council (MUI), partisan and non-
partisan groups are also increasing. They are 
more than just tending the spirituality and 
protecting religious precepts in public space, 
arguably such institution also shaped the 
government policy, through summoning to 
it in regard of religious matters – thus may 
also shape the democratic process – through 
their position as “representation” of the entire 
religious community.
Inspired by the notion of “monitory 
democracy” we establish the notion “moni-
tory society,” in order to understand the 
activities of netizens who intentionally or 
unintentionally responses to certain religious 
subject which considered important for their 
religious security. This action presumably 
derived from the digital social practice that 
open up public (netizens) participation in 
shaping certain discourse in costless manner. 
If this notion is justified then we will 
take this as the pre-condition for our research 
project that specifically focusing on religious 
blasphemy, in which through the discourse 
of monitory society the subject is no more 
confined in the legal system and religious 
precept, but it may extend into a species of 
governmentality (Foucault, 1991). Further-
more, through the investigation of the above 
subject, the research will relate it to the for-
mation of digital democracy.
Since the promulgation of the anti-blas-
phemy law – officially Presidential Decree 
No.1/1965 (in 1969 it ratified into a Law No. 
1/PNPS/1965) on the Prevention of the Reli-
gious Abuse and/or Blasphemy (hereinafter 
PNPS 1/1965) – and coupled with the Crimi-
nal Code Article 156a up until 2017, there 
were 60 cases of Religious Blasphemy, or 
roughly two cases per year (Hukumonline.
com, 2017). Other even claimed that since the 
inception of the law, there was 97 cases of 
religious blasphemy (Wardah, 2017). Many 
of the cases are cause célèbre, such as H.B. 
Jassin and Arswendo Atmowiloto (before 
UU ITE), and Alexander Aan, Ahok, Ade Ar-
mando, Sukmawati Soekarnoputri, Meiliana, 
and Abraham Moses (after the implementa-
tion of UU ITE). It is interesting to aware of 
that during the dictatorship of New Order 
(1968-1998), there was only eight cases of re-
ligious blasphemy, the rest are produced af-
ter Reformation era (Wardah, 2017; Hefner, 
2018, pp. 15–16). When this paper is finalized 
there was a new case of religious blasphemy 
indicted against two stand-up comedians, 
Tretan Muslim and Coki Pardede, incited by 
a popular ustadz, Derry Sulaiman (Rismoyo, 
2018). This latest case just gives another boost 
for the condition of “monitory society.”
Based on discussion above, we try to 
formulate our research questions: How the 
recent digital practice surrounding the dis-
course of religious blasphemy understood 
within the “monitory society”? Indonesian de-
mocracy in this regard is considered as the 
framework of modern Indonesian socio-po-
litical activities, in which all implied political 
actors, including the anti-democratic actors 
were presumed as the active agents for the 
formation, cancellation, and modification of 
democracy. Hence the final question is how 
religious blasphemy shaped the digital de-
mocracy?
The present research project is based on 
the observation upon the meso-processing of 
the issue at hand. Focus on the meso-process-
ing allowed us to see the larger pattern and 
general practice (macro-processing) only in 
limited and selected way. Even though could 
not take a deeper and continuous observation 
either, as expected in the micro-processing, 
such as taken by ethnography approach, it al-
lowed us to found interesting detail through 
interview and close observation toward the 
social media.
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Data collection initially projected to a 
broad spectrum of resources, including the 
religious authorities, law enforcement ele-
ments, such as Cyber Crime unit of the Po-
lice Force and State Attorney. However, we 
encountered some setback during the field 
research that hindered us to include those el-
ements.
The research methods employed sev-
eral techniques, viz. literature survey, digital 
data collection, interview, and focus group 
discussions (FGD). For the digital data collec-
tion, we use Facebook accounts, Twitter ac-
counts, news outlets as the core data source 
by activating 21 keywords, such as “religious 
blasphemy” Thus far, we collected roughly 
400 articles.
Altogether we interviewed ten sources 
and organizing two Focus Group Discus-
sions. The participants were including lec-
turers, social media activists and authority 
and law enforcement elements. Lastly, we 
observed in general the social media and in-
ternet sporadically, mainly from the media 
online outlets.
Theoretical Framework
There are several works that preceded 
the present undertaking and though are not 
identical in concern and scope, those became 
the backdrop for it. To name the few, the 
edited volume by Tim Lindsay and Helen 
Pausacker, Religion, Law and Intolerance in In-
donesia (Lindsey and Pausacker, 2016) deal-
ing with the relationship between law and 
intolerance in Indonesia. Within this vol-
ume the work of Nadirsyah Hosen on the 
2012 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election became 
a premium example in understanding the 
background for Ahok’s case in 2017 (Hosen, 
2016). The article from Ismail Hasani on Al-
exander Aan, the Atheist Minang would be 
among the first examples of the implemen-
tation of UU ITE upon religious blasphemy 
case (Hasani, 2016). The newly issued edited 
volume entitled Digital Indonesia: Connectiv-
ity and Divergent, edited by Edwin Jurriëns 
and Ross Tapsell (Jurriëns and Tapsell, 2017) 
though not specifically dealing with religious 
blasphemy, provided rich understanding of 
the recent development of Indonesian digital 
realm, including some issues touched upon 
the formation of digital democracy and cy-
bersecurity (Raharjo, 2017). John Postill and 
Leonard Epafras producing the analysis on 
the complexity of Indonesian hybrid media 
space with an example about the charge of 
religious blasphemy to Ahok. In the article 
they argued among other that Indonesia hy-
brid media space could became the space for 
intensifying and recasting the old issues such 
as Christianization and the peril of Indone-
sian Chinese (Postill and Epafras, 2018). 
What would be the contribution of the 
present undertaking? Taking this subject 
within the religious studies, will give a per-
spective through which the notions of “re-
ligion” and “religiosity” are problematized. 
Those are located in the classical tension be-
tween structure and subjectivity – or agency. 
The charge of religious blasphemy for in-
stance, will not be seen as part of the process 
of governance, by the powerful actors such 
as police force or Indonesian Ulema Council 
(MUI), but as also a governmentality (Fou-
cault, 1991), in which “conduct of conducts” 
as the representation of power-qua-relation-
ship is endorsed by different level of societal 
agencies, and all of those willingly or unwill-
ingly let themselves being disciplined. On 
the other hand, this can also be seen as multi-
ple understanding of religion endorsed from 
different subjectivities – in itself is a presen-
tation of “vernacular religiosity,” religious ex-
pressions of ordinary people (Ammerman, 
2007, p. 5). Hence, the implementation of UU 
ITE to the religious expression might be seen 
as the interlocking of different subjectivities 
and interpretation of religions, taking place 
in between the “structure” and the various 
“subjectivities.”
It is important to understand that the 
digital platform as an instrumentalized, 
highly mediated, and algorithmized plat-
form in which drives the information effi-
ciency that “conflates rational discourse with an 
instrumental rationalization” (Nunes, 2012, p. 
163). Over this platform we might be encoun-
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tered with the condition of “epistemic bubble” 
and “echo-chamber rationalization” that ram-
pant in the competing information exchange 
(Nguyen, 2018). The effect of this condition 
is hoaxtivism, i.e. a production, consumption 
and distribution of “hoax” as a social practice 
(Epafras, Djalong, and Kaunang, 2018).
One last note, a number of studies em-
phasis the shift of authority over the highly 
mediated system. The reporting of religious 
blasphemy mostly conducted by non-reli-
gious authority actors, hence teasing us to 
think more on subjectivity in the digital realm. 
Deleuze and Guattari proposed the notion of 
rhizome in understanding networking model 
of relationship, against the hierarchical. One 
condition of this rhizome is the disconnected 
becoming (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 11) 
of a subjectivity on digital platform, that is 
not necessarily a “disconnection” from the 
existing and traditional hierarchical system, 
but in many ways is a new initiative to forge 
link and subscription to different authorities, 
hence creating a heterarchical connectivity 
(Crumley, 1995; Epafras, 2016, p. 7). Taking 
this together, we may encounter complicated 
arrangement of religious authority and the 
formation of digital democracy.
DISCUSSION
Historically, many of the world religions 
created the boundary encircled what is pre-
sumed as the sanctity of religious precepts by 
developed the logic of Othering. The Roman/
Latin Catholic church established the Curia 
Romana and Inquisition Court in order to se-
cure the Church’s teaching from defamation 
and blasphemy (Lynn, 2015). The Protestant 
Reformators, notably Martin Luther and John 
Calvin were also maintained harsh measures 
against Protestant’s dissidents (Levy, 1998, p. 
569, 2005). 
Those boundaries making was getting 
even more gravity in the digital age. Earlier 
research on hoaxtivism, the team found that 
beside the dividends brought the digital com-
munication; it also brought ambiguity such as 
the creation of an epistemic bubble for people 
that limit their interest to meet face-to-face 
with other parties. This is only emphasis the 
problem of the validity of the information 
traffic among the parties as well, unless they 
invest sufficient time to filter and clarify the 
information. Furthermore, the technology is 
affirming the condition of individualization 
of modern age in which it turned a social self 
into “a reflexive self,” which is in daily prac-
tice appeared in the digital narcissism and 
clicktivism. This in turn might be severed the 
existing social cohesion. From the perspec-
tive of law enforcer, in this case attorney, the 
condition is confirmed through the increas-
ing number of cases of the defamation, re-
ligious blasphemy, online scam, hoax, and 
black campaign charges by way of UU ITE. 
The proposed notion of “monitory soci-
ety,” i.e. “public participation on monitoring 
social lives, in which the objective is not nec-
essarily in line with democratic ideals such 
as a better public policy, but a reflection of 
parochial ends,” might be also an extension 
of Foucauldian “governmentality,” a life 
governance conducted by different element 
of society in the maintaining certain version 
of social lives. On the level of social practice, 
this condition amplified by social media, 
which gave a strong incentive for people to 
penetrate other people lives – kepoism in In-
donesian popular expression – to take inter-
est of other people doing and activities. This 
is indeed increasing the public participation 
as well in socio-political lives including the in 
the political lives such as the presidential and 
gubernatorial elections. “Arab Springs” gave 
an ample image on how the digital commu-
nication truly makes a significant change in a 
political landscape. Nonetheless, as the case 
of Jakarta gubernatorial election taught us, it 
also marking the fundamental shift of people 
interaction, to the point many people lament-
ed for the loss of tabayyun and silahturahmi 
ethos, and other lamented for the coming 
of the “Post-Truth” society. All in all, it may 
emphasis the condition of the fourth phase of 
internet control, observed by Deibert (2012), 
the phase of “the access contested” in which 
indicated by competition of accessibility and 
control, not only by the government, but also 
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by the corporates, and the public at large. 
Many cases of religious blasphemy, such 
as Arswendo Atmowiloto, Alexander Aan, 
Ahok, Ade Armando, and the last one, Ustad 
Evie Effendi, were endorsed and incited by 
non-governmental, non-official actors such 
as Jonru and IPNU (Ikatan Pelajar Nahdlatul 
Ulama – Nahdlatul Ulama Student Associa-
tion). 
The public practice of reporting certain 
cases through the various digital outlets were 
in itself could be seen as the improvement of 
public participation in the law enforcement, 
in particular in shaping the digital society. 
However, the enthusiasm for charging other 
people through these venues in part reflected 
the aforementioned reflexive condition rath-
er than, as an informer lamented, projecting 
the legal ideal, in particular in Indonesian 
context, i.e. the criminal charge is the last op-
tion after the other socio-cultural options are 
exhausted. 
The condition of “monitory society” in 
regards of religious blasphemy case might be 
best illustrated by the cause celebre, such as 
the 2017 Jakarta’s gubernatorial race, which 
implicated to one of the candidates, Basuki 
Purnama Tjahja, renowned as Ahok. There 
were 14 reportings on Ahok’s alleged act of 
religious blasphemy submitted to five re-
gional police departments. Most of reporters 
were civilians and/or civil society organiza-
tions.
To understand further the above com-
plicated condition of “monitory society”, 
in the following some observation from the 
field research might give a better sense of the 
above condition. The shortlist is included an 
attorney, government officials, MUI repre-
sentation, a newspaper representation, case 
in Bali Island and in Manado. 
The first informer, an attorney in an in-
terview assessed, in a nostalgic tone that be-
fore the expose of digital technology, there 
were musyawarah (discussion), tabayyun (act 
of clarification), and other intimate and face-
to-face communication that prevailed over 
the criminal indictment. The present day 
marked with the hyper-sensitive interaction 
that forced the attorney to deal with trivial 
issues over minor differences among the peo-
ple. Personally, he tended to recommend to 
the parties in dispute to take the “familial” 
approach (penyelesaian secara kekeluargaan), 
over legal measure. He envisioned that UU 
ITE is not a judgemental instrument, as it 
provides security and safety in using digital 
communication. In general, this principle for 
him, is the fulfilment of the restorative jus-
tice.
The government position, in this case 
the Ministry of Communication and Infor-
mation (Kementerian Komunikasi dan Infor-
masi–hereinafter Kemenkominfo) on the 
issue of religious lives and in particular on 
the religious blasphemy is expected to main-
tain the stability and the status quo. As the 
guardian of the establishment of the digital 
society, Kemenkominfo does not defining the 
legal and religious aspect of the digital inter-
action, such as in the case of hoax, LGBT and 
religious blasphemy. It depended entirely on 
the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Law 
Enforcement’s understanding on the respect-
ed issues. However, the Ministry actively 
endorsed the existing religious institutions 
to provide guidance on the “responsible in-
ternetting and social media practice.” It 
helped to produced the Muamallah Medsos, 
“Dealing with Social Media” by Indonesian 
Ulama Council (MUI/Majelis Ulama Indonesia 
(2017)), Warga Gereja Gereja Merespon Revolusi 
Media Sosial: Panduan Bermedia Sosial, “The 
Church Members Responded the Social Me-
dia Revolution: A Guidance for Social Me-
dia Activities” by Indonesian Fellowship of 
Churches (PGI/Persekutuan Gereja-Gereja In-
donesia) (PGI, 2018), and Pedoman Penggunaan 
Media Sosial, “The Guidance for Social Media 
Usage” by the Bishop’s Conference of Indo-
nesian (KWI/Konferensi Waligereja Indonesia) 
(Nugroho and Oetomo, 2018). 
UU ITE, endorsed by Kemenkominfo, 
is the only legal safeguarding for internet 
and social media activity. However, when 
confronted with the reality of “very flexible” 
implementation of the law, which claimed 
many “ordinary people” in order to save “the 
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powerful,” the government official pointed 
out the importance of government regulation 
to control the overspilling effect of the inter-
net. There is “no absolute freedom of speech” 
(“Tidak mutlak kebebasannya untuk berbicara 
atau beropini”). 
Another government official pointed out 
that the discourse of “religious blasphemy” 
strongly related to the Islamic position in 
maintaining the purity of religious precept, 
rather than a generic discourse of all religions 
in Indonesia. He also emphasized the elastic 
understanding of “religious blasphemy” of-
fered by the religious authority, such as in the 
case of Arswendo Atmowiloto, renowned as 
“Monitor case” (1990) and Tajul Muluk case in 
Sampang (2012). The boundary was so broad 
that it gave a space for insertion of the politi-
cal agenda into the case.
In connection with the government 
policy, he further lamented that the legisla-
tion process of religious issue conducted by 
the lawmakers “in Senayan” – the seat of the 
House of Representation – were lack of re-
ligious insights upon the issues and instead 
of resolution the problem they created frag-
mentation and discrepancy on the policy im-
plementation, including between the central 
and regional governments.
At the level of non-governmental reli-
gious institution, MUI became a case in hand 
in understanding the intricacy of the societal 
element of monitory society. MUI is a reflec-
tion of monitory democracy, as it played in 
two fronts, as a “player” at the front stage 
and “neutral judge” in the backstage. At the 
front stage it actively monitoring the Islam-
ic matters circulated in the Muslim and the 
larger public space. Since the Reformation, 
notably during the administration of Susilo 
Bambang Yudoyono (renowned as SBY), 
was given more muscle and its status was no 
more symbolic as in the past. The council be-
came an active player in defending Muslim 
affairs and interests, even at the level of dis-
ciplining any other religious groups, mostly 
within Islam, which was considered display-
ing a dissidence tendency. On the backstage, 
MUI actives in judicial process, notably if the 
case of what considered as religious blasphe-
my emerged, by positioning as expert con-
sultant and religious authority referred by 
the law enforcements. Both positions reached 
through two different measures, i.e. persua-
sive and combative.
Unique position held by Republika, the 
largest Muslim newspaper in the country. It 
become an active monitory subject just like 
any other press, Republika hold the view 
that in general Indonesian Muslims stucked 
in the “procedural democracy” after a huge eu-
phoria immediately after the downfall of Soe-
harto. The quality of Indonesian democracy 
is stagnant and it never benefitting Muslim 
constituents in substantive way. Therefore, 
Republika channeling the Indonesian Mus-
lim grieve in pushing the democratic corri-
dor toward the larger Muslim’s public space.
From the perspective of human rights 
enforcement, religious blasphemy is only a 
subset of the larger discussion of the free-
dom of religious expression. And the picture 
is bleak as the mounted victims of the Blas-
phemy Law. An official from The National 
Commission on Human Rights (Komisi Nasi-
onal Hak Asasi Manusia – Komnasham) made 
a critical assessment toward the Blasphemy 
Law (PNPS 1/1965). Indonesia, he alluded 
that what is needed in Indonesia is not such 
blasphemy law, but a law who managed the 
religious lives and interaction among reli-
gious communities.
In the case of Bali Hinduism, the chal-
lenge of religious lives is somewhat related 
to the tension among the Balinese Hindus 
and transnational Hindu religious expres-
sion, such as Sai Baba movement, Balinese 
Hindus and the cosmopolitan representa-
tions through tourism industry, and the 
migrants, including the Javanese migrants. 
Hence, the complicated inter-religious inter-
action among other framed within the rais-
ing ethno-nationalism among some Balinese, 
revolved around the figure such as Arya We-
dakarna, “the intolerance Hindu” (see Muhajir, 
Artawan and Adnyana, 2013).
Finally, the religious blasphemy case 
recalled the organization of the Interfaith 
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New Generation Initiative and Engagement 
(INGAGE) program, in Manado, North Su-
lawesi. The case was trigerred when some of 
the participants shared the enthusiasm and 
interfaith experiences in the social media. 
While many of the activities were replicat-
ing the regular interfaith activities such as 
visiting house of worships, others – in fact, 
non-programmatic – were included the par-
ticipation in the Friday’s prayer service. To 
the latter was the incitement of many North 
Sulawesi’s Muslim community was directed, 
which including the charge of religious blas-
phemy as it was presumed as the trespass-
ing of religious boundary. Huge efforts were 
conducted to limit the aftereffect, including a 
series of cordial visits to the government and 
religious institutions to explain the situation 
on the ground. 
CONCLUSION
In general, the discourse of religious 
blasphemy in Indonesia is dealing with pub-
lic piety and social order. It concerned more 
on religious boundary rather than the im-
provement of religious lives and personal 
piety. Digital technology that flourished af-
ter the fall of New Order just gives a larger 
incentive for the spreadout of religious blas-
phemy as the implication of the digital logic 
of which emphasize access, efficiency and 
maximum performance of the message circu-
lated. 
Within the digital context, the discourse 
has to be understood within at least two con-
ditions. Firstly, the logic of virality, collec-
tive action, and larger public participation 
became almost a “rule of thumb,” as earlier 
claimed the condition of “monitory society.” 
Secondly, there is no dichotomy between 
“truth” and “falsehood,” “religionist” and 
“trickster,” as all of them are inhabit the same 
instrumentalized platform. This might be the 
condition lamented by many as a condition 
of “post-truth society,” in which people do 
not interested in hard fact but aligned them-
selves to the ideological, taste, emotional and 
political leaning. At this juncture, the politics 
of Othering found its home, often framed 
within the discourse of religious blasphemy. 
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